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 Abstract: The concept of toleration occupies an important position in contemporary societal 
debates. I will analyse the concept by considering the apparent inconsistency between what 
I regard as the genuine meaning of the concept of toleration and the prevalent common 
perception of toleration. One essential factor in the concept of toleration is the negative 
evaluation of the subject matter. However, this decisive feature appears to have become obsolete 
in the prevalent common perception of toleration. I will examine the normative implications of 
the imprecise usage of t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´  caused by the vague perception of the concept. 
Furthermore, I argue there to be a significant, yet underemphasised linguistic power inherent 
to t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´ , which is influential in how it perpetuates negative attitudes towards 
various minorities and maintains thereby unjust societal relations. Since ´ toleration´ /´ tolerance´  
appears insufficient to address the changed social reality in which attitudes towards minorities 
have remarkably progressed, I will adopt the approach of conceptual engineering to outline a 
concept capable of replacing t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´ . I suggest that a new concept to supersede 
toleration should carry the ethos of respect, yet have the conceptual scope and precision of 
tolerance/toleration, to be intuitively appealing to replace it. I propose to replace t´oleration´  
with r´espectation´  and t´olerance´  with r´espectance´ .
Key words: toleration, tolerance, respect, linguistic power, conceptual engineering, political 
philosophy of language.
SECTION 1 – ON THE SOCIETA L STA N DING OF THE CONCEPT OF TOLER ATION
On a general note, different conceptions of words and concepts are pivotal in the 
way they have normative implications on our thinking. In the sphere of charged concepts 
in morally and politically relevant discourses, I consider the concept of toleration as 
particularly significant, since different conceptions of toleration are consequential in 
societal terms. 
Issues around toleration are substantive in the 21st century. Due, for instance, to 
growth in immigration numbers, many contemporary Western societies HAVE diversified 
significantly in recent decades. Moreover, the gained acceptance of various minority groups 
seems to motivate the usage of the concept of toleration all the more, since there appear to 
be good grounds to argue that these societies have become more tolerant.1 
Nevertheless, the reputation of toleration/tolerance as a contemporary common 
virtue that is celebrated among liberals is inconsistent with the original meaning of the 
word which is rooted in a negative evaluation of the subject matter.2 Despite this obvious 
1]  A lthough the expression “more tolerant” seems perfectly plausible in common language, I 
find it ultimately unclear.
2] I want to emphasise that since t´oleration´  is the established notion to be utilised in liberal dis-
courses regarding minorities, it appears understandable that t´oleration´  or t´olerance´ , is the term still 
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discrepancy, t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´  has become a code word that sets the paradigm 
for political discourse particularly in contemporary liberal debates on minority issues.3 
One notable outcome from the benevolently used, yet imprecisely perceived concept 
of toleration, is that t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´  has become overused. Moreover, it appears 
to be the only recognised, if not the best conceivable concept to indicate an affirmative 
attitude or acceptance of minorities. 
When elaborating on tolerance and the societal standing of the concept, the topic 
of intolerance looms unavoidably as a concern to be acknowledged. Therefore, it appears 
understandable that toleration/tolerance is considered a safeguard to protect from 
intolerance. I argue, nevertheless, that in many Western societies the current social reality 
has developed remarkably further so that the general attitude towards many minorities 
has evolved beyond mere tolerance. I find the following sentence, foregrounded on the 
website of the US-based educational project Teaching Tolerance, revealing. “Tolerance is 
surely an imperfect term, yet the English language offers no single word that embraces 
the broad range of skills we need to live together peacefully.” (Teaching Tolerance, 2019)
The circumstance that the English language is lacking a word for such essential 
competences in the 21st century, calls for an engagement in conceptual engineering to 
search for a suitable word.4 Towards the end of this paper, I will outline a concept which 
is also not perfect, but could perhaps more adequately fulfil the conceptual task of 
t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´ . 
SECTION 2 – ON THE SHIFTED PERCEPTION OF THE CONCEPT OF TOLER ATION
I will begin my exploration of the shifted perception of toleration with a 
definition of the concept. A concise formal definition of the concept goes as follows:
resorted to in references to various minority groups.
3]  I consider a possibly perceived difference between toleration and tolerance , as merely techni-
cal without any conceptual difference between the two terms. The similarity of toleration and toler-
ance becomes manifest also by the circumstance that they are being used interchangeably. In this 
paper, I will mainly utilise the compound form: ´toleration /´´tolerance ,´ to cover the whole range of 
the concept with both TER MS. 
Nevertheless, there are some authors, who conceptually differentiate between toleration and 
tolerance. Notable examples are Balint (2017, 26), who argues that while in specific acts of tolerance an 
objection is required, in the general practice of toleration it is not; and Zucca (2012, 5), who in contrast 
considers toleration to be a moralising attitude, whereas he regards tolerance as a natural disposition to 
cope with diversity. However, I consider such a differentiation between toleration and tolerance arbi-
trary, since both toleration and tolerance share the word stem toler- (from the Latin verb tolerō – to bear, 
endure, tolerate – see also n. 7 below). 
4]  Conceptual engineering or conceptual ethics is an emerging field in recent contemporary phi-
losophy. It is a practice of assessing the scope of concepts, analysing if a certain concept is adequate 
to indicate a particular meaning, and whether this concept can be extended and improved. A good 
introductory account on conceptual engineering is given by: Cappelen 2018. Fixing Language – An 
Essay on Conceptual Engineering , and Burgess, Cappelen & Plunkett, (forthcoming).
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(Condition 1): X has a negative evaluation of Y
(Condition 2): X has the potential to interfere with Y
(Condition 3): X refrains from interfering with Y
This definition constitutes, what is being called the s´tandard notion´ of 
toleration.5 The dynamics of the three conditions involved in the standard notion, 
interplay in such a way that the acceptance component, which is the result of 
Condition 3 does not cancel out, but overrides the objection component, which is 
the result of Condition 1. This constellation leads to toleration of the subject matter 
in question. (Forst 2013, 20) 
Even if the function of ´toleration´ as a socio-political linguistic operator to 
indicate a certain disposition, has remained the same in common discourses, the 
common perception of toleration appears to have somewhat shifted. Concerning 
the hypothesised shift in the common perception, the crucial point is that the first 
condition: X has a negative evaluation of Y, is not considered as being essential to 
the concept of toleration anymore. 
I hypothesise that, in liberal discourses, two overlapping and mutually 
reinforcing tendencies in the usage of the term ´toleration /´´tolerance´ have 
occurred, which cause the gradual change in the common perception of toleration. 
First, when ´toleration /´´tolerance´ is utilised in common usage, i), the negative 
evaluation of the subject matter has often gradually weakened or may have even 
disappeared. Moreover, there seems to be ii) a decreased awareness about the 
negative evaluation of the subject matter being present in the concept. 
I hypothesise that the development in which many minorities have become 
accepted and gained recognition in Western societies in recent decades, has 
facilitated the described shift in the perception of the concept. As a result, the 
prevalent common perception of toleration seems to have departed from the original 
conception of the concept to such an extent that now it does not necessarily involve 
a negative evaluation of the subject matter, for instance, a particular minority. 
In a certain sense, the general attitude customarily referred to with 
´toleration /´´tolerance´ seems to have evolved beyond the linguistic term that ought 
to describe that attitude. However, if one still acknowledges the standard notion of 
toleration which is bound to a negative evaluation of the subject matter, then there 
seems to emerge an inconsistency between the evolved i) general disposition or 
common public attitude, in which the negative evaluation of the subject matter may, 
or may not have become omitted, and the ii) label: ´toleration /´´tolerance´ given for 
that disposition. 
Since the concept of toleration is so consequential and important in 
contemporary societal discourses, it becomes crucial whether the concept in its 
various instantiations is perceived to involve a negative evaluation of its respective 
5]  For instance, Galeotti (2015, 94) refers to the ‘standard notion’. 
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subject matter. Therefore, I argue it to be critical that the evaluation of the subject 
matter (negative or non-negative) can be construed correctly according to the 
intention of who is utilising t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´ . In the next section, I will elaborate 
on what I consider the genuine meaning of the concept of toleration.
SECTION 3 – ON THE GEN UINE M E A NING OF THE CONCEPT OF TOLER ATION
In this section, I will apply the approach of conceptual engineering to examine 
the conceptual scope of toleration, and the reasonable extension thereof. I will 
analyse the concept by seeking to dismantle it into its i) semantic content and ii) 
form, to explore the malleability and the plausible conceptual limits of toleration.6 I 
aim to examine, if the first condition of the standard notion of toleration: a negative 
evaluation of the subject matter, is ultimately essential to the concept itself. 
Let s´ assume that when referring to a certain minority group, or a specific 
feature attributed to that group, that the agent using ´toleration /´´tolerance´ would 
hold a neutral or positive evaluation about the minority group or the attributed 
feature in question. If one construes the concept of toleration to be profoundly 
indeterminate and unbound to a particular evaluation, then it seems hypothetically 
plausible that the evaluation of the subject matter (in this example case, neutral or 
positive) would be considered as predicating the semantic content of toleration. 
I argue, nonetheless, that in the particular case of ´toleration ,´ the concept 
cannot exhaustively be disentangled into its semantic content and form, since the 
i) linguistic form of the concept shaped by the word stem toler*, is fundamentally 
constitutive also for the ii) semantic content of the concept. I consider the stem 
toler* in the word ´toleration /´´tolerance´ as decisive since it predicates the meaning 
of the concept in that it signifies enduring, forbearing and sustaining hardship.7
Therefore, despite the apparent shift in the prevalent common perception 
of toleration, I defend the position that the concept of toleration has a certain 
definite meaning that is constituted primarily by the form of the word, prefixed 
with toler*. Thus, it becomes intuitively evident in a linguistic sense that the 
concept of toleration is intrinsically marked by a negative evaluation of the subject 
matter, which is implicitly present in the concept and should not be overlooked. 
I argue that the meaning of the concept of toleration is bound to the roots of the 
expression that are given by its Latin origins, from which also the English word 
´toleration /´´tolerance´ is derived.
As the prefix toler- postulates the meaning of the concept of toleration, the 
differing evaluations (negative, neutral, or positive) of the subject matter that may 
6]  By i) semantic content of the concept, I refer to the meaning the concept indicates. By ii) 
form of the concept, I refer to the shape of the concept, as it appears as a particular word.
7]  The word stem toler- is derived from the Latin verb tolerō: Oxford Latin Dictionary, 2012.
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lay behind the application of the term ´toleration /´´tolerance ,´ become eventually 
subjugated to what I consider as a primordially essential part of the concept of 
toleration, namely the negative evaluation of the subject matter.
As a conclusion of this section, I argue that the traditional conception or standard 
notion of toleration ref lects the genuine meaning of the concept of toleration, 
whereas the prevalent common conception does not. Particularly since issues in 
which the concept of toleration is frequently utilised are often pivotal in societal 
discourses in contemporary Western societies, it makes the concept inf luential in 
the moral and political realm. Therefore, the utilisation of ´toleration /´´tolerance´ 
should be strictly reserved for instances in which there is a negative evaluation of the 
subject matter. Otherwise, there is the risk that the concept of toleration becomes 
perceived as vague and unclear.
SECTION 4 – ON THE I MPLICATION OF THE OBJECTION COMPONENT IN 
´TOLER ATION /´´TOLER A NCE´ 
In this section, I will inspect the significance of the objection component which 
results from the negative evaluation of the subject matter, for expressions containing 
´toleration /´´tolerance .´ I will analyse two different interpretations of how the 
meaning of the concept of toleration can be construed, by means of an example 
sentence. The first interpretation is based on the i) prevalent common perception of 
toleration in which the objection component is omitted. The second interpretation 
is based on the ii) traditional conception in which the objection component is 
assumed to hold. Thus, the decisive factor between the two interpretations regards 
whether or not the objection component is assumed. 
Think of the following plausible sentence: “Same-sex marriage laws in Western 
countries are legal manifestations of societal tolerance”. Let s´ assume for the sake of 
a thought experiment that the agent utilising “tolerance” in the sentence, does not 
hold a negative but a neutral or positive evaluation of two persons of the same sex 
getting married.8
I hypothesise that two different basic interpretations, according to differing 
conceptions of the concept of toleration, may emerge about the sentence. According 
to i) the prevalent common perception of toleration which has omitted the objection 
component in the concept of toleration, the ´ tolerance´ in the sentence is presumably 
construed as indicating a neutral or positive evaluation of same-sex marriage laws. 
According to ii) the traditional conception, on the other hand, the meaning of 
´tolerance´ in the sentence is construed as indicating a negative evaluation of same-
sex marriage laws.
8]  Thus, my example sentence is a more concrete explication of the constellation outlined in a 
more abstract form in section 3.
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Thus, a presumable interpretation of the sentence, along the lines of the 
traditional conception of toleration could be as follows: “Same-sex marriage 
laws in Western countries, are a legal manifestation of the acceptance of same-
sex couples getting married, even if the possibility of same-sex couples getting 
married is generally unwanted in the society”.9 Although this interpretation of 
the sentence may appear overly literal, it is perfectly in line with the traditional 
conception of toleration. Since according to the traditional conception, the term 
´toleration /´´tolerance as a conceptual tool is inclining the recipients of a sentence 
in which ´toleration /´´tolerance´ appears, to form a negative evaluation of the 
subject matter in question.
I argue that the crucial condition about the two different interpretations of 
the sentence is that there is no decisive internal factor in the sentence which would 
incline towards one of the interpretations. All that matters, seems to be whether one 
holds the i) prevalent positively laden conception of toleration which has omitted 
the negative evaluation of the subject matter, or the ii) traditional conception of 
toleration. I find, however, that the concept of toleration is societally too significant, 
to be exposed to arbitrary variables, such as educational background or political 
views that lead to holding one of the two conceptions of toleration. 
One can probably comprehend that the circumstance regarding two different 
conceptions of “societal tolerance” in the example sentence, is unbearable 
particularly for the ones exposed to it, namely same-sex couples who want to get 
married. This calls to settle the incompatibility between the two conceptions of 
toleration. I argue that the traditional conception is ultimately more convincing 
since it is faithful to what the concept of toleration was originally used for, namely 
to indicate acceptance of a particular subject matter, despite a negative evaluation 
of it. Moreover, the traditional conception of toleration functions conceptually in 
simpler terms than the prevalent ambiguous conception, in that it does not involve 
any omitting of the basic premises of the concept.
In this section, I have shown through an analysis of the example sentence that 
the mere appearance of ´toleration /´´tolerance´ in an expression, has the potential 
to restore the value evaluation of the subject matter in question as negative. There is 
always the possibility to construe a negative evaluation about the particular subject 
matter, referred to with ´toleration /´´tolerance ,´ irrespectively of the intentions 
of the agent utilising ´toleration /´´tolerance´ and regardless of whether the agent 
themselves may hold a neutral or positive evaluation of the subject matter. Thus, 
I argue that the concept of toleration as a linguistic tool is essentially independent 
from how the concept is used and perceived. 
9]  I consider the mentioned interpretation (“Same-sex marriage laws in Western countries are 
a legal manifestation of the acceptance of same-sex couples getting married, even if the possibility of 
same-sex couples getting married is generally unwanted in the society”) should not be ruled out, if 
only to retain the liberty to express one s´ hesitation about same-sex couples’ getting married.
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SECTION 5 – ON THE USAGE OF ´TOLER ATION /´´TOLER A NCE´ IN THE PR EVA LENT 
COM MON CONCEPTION
Although I take a quite literal view about the meaning of the concept of 
toleration, I acknowledge that in the contemporary social reality, the common 
perception of ´toleration/tolerance´ is on the contrary rather indeterminate, as I 
showed in Section 2. Therefore, I consider it worthwhile to examine further the 
shifted prevalent conception of toleration and the implications of the usage of a shifted 
version of ´toleration/tolerance .´ In the prevalent conception the features which I 
hypothesise to contribute to the popularity of the usage of ´toleration /´´tolerance´ 
are particularly noteworthy, and therefore I will focus on them. 
The trait in the prevalent conception of toleration which emphasises the 
acceptance, and downplays the objection component, seems to facilitate the usage of 
´toleration/tolerance .´ Thereby, the elevated reputation of the concept of toleration 
enables to draw the attention to one s´ acceptance of e.g. a certain minority group 
while disguising, and yet maintaining one s´ negative evaluation of that minority 
group. This feature in the usage of ´toleration /´´tolerance´ is an element which 
obviously charges the concept of toleration with significant power.10
I find Foucault s´ well-known observation that the success of power is 
proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms, highlights an important 
aspect in the common usage of ´toleration/tolerance .´ (1980, 86) Regarding the 
feature of hiding the mechanism of power in the prevalent usage of ´toleration/
tolerance ,´ there seems then to occur a disguising operation which functions; by i) 
bracketing the negative evaluation in the concept, or rendering it as merely implicit, 
and by ii) highlighting the acceptance of the subject matter in question: for instance, 
a certain minority.
Considering the power component in the common usage of ´toleration/
tolerance´ seen from a Foucauldian perspective, I hypothesise the power 
component to function the better the objection of the subject matter is disguised. 
I hypothesise, furthermore, that the present distorted perception of toleration is 
not just an arbitrary collateral consequence of the imprecise usage of the concept 
but a significant, yet underemphasised reason behind the popularity of the usage of 
´toleration /´´tolerance´ in liberal discourses. Perhaps the most significant feature 
in the prevalent conception of toleration is the ambivalence regarding the negative 
evaluation of the subject matter, since eventually the acceptance component 
overrides any possible objection component. 
Another important characteristic with the prevalent common conception 
of ´toleration /´´tolerance´ is the tendency to utilise ´toleration /´´tolerance´ in a 
general manner without any reference to a particular subject matter e.g. a certain 
10]  I will further explore the aspect of power in the concept of toleration, in Section 6.
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minority group. I find the following definition given by the UNESCO about the 
“Meaning of tolerance”, a prime example of this “Tolerance is respect, acceptance, 
and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression 
and ways of being human”. (UNESCO, 1995) 
The concept of tolerance is used here as a reification of universal goodwill 
towards diversity per se. The sentence is, moreover, an example of the shifted 
common perception of toleration, in which the objection component has completely 
disappeared since there is no negative evaluation about any subject matter to be 
found in the sentence. One could possibly argue that UNESCO s´ definition of 
tolerance is a counterexample of a real transformation of the concept, examined in 
Section 2. In the claimed transformation, ´tolerance´ need not involve a negative 
evaluation anymore, if only it is reframed in context with concepts which are not 
based on a negative evaluation. However, I consider already the beginning of the 
sentence “Tolerance is respect…” contradictory, since ´ tolerance´ is genuinely based 
on a negative, yet r´espect´ is genuinely based on a neutral or positive evaluation of 
the subject matter. Moreover, if the asserted “respect, acceptance and appreciation 
of the rich diversity [...] of being human”, would be sincere, there would be no need 
to describe this attitude as ´tolerance .´
SECTION 6 – ON THE ELEM ENT OF POW ER IN THE CONCEPT OF TOLER ATION
In the philosophical literature on toleration, the prevalent usage of the concept 
is taken as a given mode of discourse in societal debates, and the insufficiencies 
related to the concept have not been properly addressed. Particularly the element 
of linguistic power inherent to the concept has been underemphasised. By 
linguistic power in the concept of toleration, I refer particularly to the i) negative 
evaluation of the respective subject matter which, I argue, is always latently present 
in the concept and cannot be neglected, and the ii) normative implications that 
derive from its usage.11 Given that the standard notion of toleration is assumed to 
hold, these implications involve the reinforcement and perpetuation of negative 
evaluations of, for instance, various minorities by referring to these minorities 
with ´toleration /´´tolerance´ in common public debates. Accordingly, I argue that 
adherence to ´toleration /´´tolerance´ risks the possibility of maintaining pernicious 
societal power relations. 
Nevertheless, a few authors, notably Emanuela Ceva and Wendy Brown, have 
indeed addressed the power dimension in the concept of toleration. I will elaborate 
on their respective accounts in the following. The s´tandard notion´ of toleration 
acknowledges the power component in terms of Condition 2 (X has the potential 
11]  With being latently present, I refer to the condition that the negative evaluation of the sub-
ject matter is in some instances assumed, whereas in others it is omitted. 
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to interfere with Y). Ceva adds as a complementary note a further condition to it, 
which stipulates that the relation between the tolerating agent and the tolerated 
subject(s) is unequal. (2011, 6-7) She recognises the linguistic aspect of power in 
that the framing of, e.g. minority issues in terms of toleration, “legitimises” the idea 
that the issue at stake, is an object of a negative evaluation. (2011, 15)
Brown, for her part, emphasises the strong rhetorical aspect of toleration 
in specific historical and cultural power discourses. (2006, 9) She argues, in a 
discernibly Foucauldian fashion, that attention should be paid to how the usage 
of toleration constitutes social, political, religious and cultural norms, and how it 
structures practices of permission and regulation. (2006, 13) Brown asserts that 
discourses of toleration and the usage of the concept of tolerance not only alleviate, 
for instance, racism, homophobia, and ethnic prejudices, but also maintain these 
attitudes. (2006, 10) Here, I consider the alleviating element as an improvement 
in contrast to discourses of intolerance. However, the usage of ´tolerance´ also 
maintains these negative attitudes, since it reinforces the unequal relation between 
the tolerating and tolerated subjects. 
I follow Brown s´ argument that sentences of historical and cultural power 
discourses, in which the concept of tolerance appears, represent discourses of power. 
However, in contrast to Brown s´ somewhat imprecise reference to “discourses of 
tolerance”, which renew and reinforce societal power relations, I would argue that 
the power component in ´toleration /´´tolerance´ originates primarily from the 
concept itself. The rationale to locate the crux of the power component in the word 
´toleration /´´tolerance ,´ is that the negative evaluation about the respective subject 
matter is eventually postulated by the word stem toler* in the concept of toleration.
Ceva brings up the pernicious implication of utilising ´toleration /´´tolerance´ 
by remarking that the concept of toleration presupposes a negative attitude that 
people in the social reality otherwise may, or may not have. (2011, 16) Thus, applying 
the concept of toleration may arguably restore and perpetuate negative attitudes, 
which would otherwise be already overcome. Brown notes regarding the structuring 
feature of utilising ´toleration /´´tolerance´ that discourses of toleration sustain an 
arrangement into subjects of tolerance who are inferior, deviant or marginal to 
those practising tolerance. (2006, 13) The people of the tolerated minority group 
receive by the expression of ´tolerance´ a negative evaluation which has detrimental 
impacts, particularly if members of the minority internalise the negative evaluation 
of themselves.12 
The disguising of the negative evaluation of the subject matter, addressed in 
Section 5, comes close to Brown s´ assertion that discourses related to tolerance 
have a strong tendency of depoliticisation. This depoliticisation functions by 
12]  On internalised racism, internalised oppression, and internalised dominance, see 
Di A ngelo: W hat Does It Mean to Be W hite? Developing W hite Racial Literacy.
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construing inequality, subordination, marginalisation, and social conf lict, as 
personal or individual, or as natural, religious or cultural. Brown argues further 
that in discourses around tolerance, group conf licts are cast in religious, ethnic, or 
cultural differences. (2006, 15) For Brown difference as such becomes the subject of 
tolerance, as she argues that: “[a]n object of tolerance [...] is identified as naturally 
and essentially different from the tolerating subject; in this difference, it appears as 
a natural provocation to that which tolerates it”. (2006, 15)
Developing Brown s´ thoughts further, I argue that the mere expression of 
´toleration /´´tolerance´ triggers a dynamics of an uneven power relation. Consider 
a general statement such as: “We should foster tolerance in education”. I argue that 
it creates an attitude of reservation towards anything different in the context of 
education. In turn, when ´tolerance´ is utilised with a particular subject in mind, 
it triggers a power relation between the agent who employs ´tolerance´ and the 
designated subjects referred to with the term. Hereby, the agent utilising ´tolerance ,´ 
i) posits themselves above the subject(s) of toleration, ii) assumes the right to make 
a negative evaluation about the subject(s), and, furthermore, ii) posits the subject(s) 
as exposed to being tolerated.
SECTION 7 – ON THE INSU FFICIENCY OF THE CONCEPT OF TOLER ATION
In this section, I will elaborate further on what I consider being significant 
weaknesses of the concept of toleration. These deficiencies motivate to reconsider the 
utilisation of t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´  in many instances. In addition to the intrinsic 
power component in the concept which posits the subjects of toleration as inferior and 
perpetuates unjust societal relations, there are further aspects related to the common 
prevalent usage of t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´  that makes the concept insufficient for 
contemporary demands. Regarding, for instance, the assumed progressiveness of 
the concept of t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´ , Ceva´ s remark is revealing that in appeals for 
toleration, it is far from clear and uncontroversial what such appeals actually mean and 
require. (2011, 1)
I will explore the asserted inadequacies of the concept of toleration by continuing 
to examine some examples concerning the utilisation of t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´ . I will 
begin with the example sentence invoked in Section 4: “Same-sex marriage laws in 
Western countries are manifestations of societal tolerance”. Let s´ assume according 
to my example sentence that someone who does not have a negative but a neutral or 
positive evaluation of two persons of the same sex getting married, nonetheless utilises 
t´oleration´ /´ tolerance´  to express their evaluation about two persons of the same sex 
getting married.13 If we assume further the traditional conception of toleration (in 
13]  I wa nt to emphasise, however, t hat t he ad herence to t he usage of ´tolerat ion/toler-
a nce´ is rat her to be conceived as a lack of del iberate choice, si nce no a lter nat ive concept is yet 
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which the negative evaluation of the subject matter is a basic premise) to hold, this will 
then lead to a misrepresentation about the evaluation of the subject matter. 
The misrepresentation emerges, in that the evaluation of the subject matter 
(in this case about the possibility of two persons of the same sex getting married) 
is positive but the traditional conception of toleration presents the evaluation as 
negative.14 However, more significant than the misrepresentation in the descriptive 
sense per se is how it affects the normative level by restoring the negative evaluation 
of a particular subject matter. 
I argue that along the lines of the traditional conception of toleration, the 
restoration of the negative evaluation occurs by resorting to t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ 
when referring to a particular subject in common language usage. Thereby, the 
negative evaluation of the subject matter, e.g. a certain minority group, becomes 
perpetuated which has pernicious implications on how the particular minority group 
is regarded in the common public.
My second example sentence comes from the following newspaper headline: 
“Why Ireland leads in tolerance towards immigrants”. (McWilliams, 2018) The 
relevant essence of the headline is its latter part: “tolerance towards immigrants”. 
This formulation is invoked frequently, since immigrants are typically considered as 
being a plausible subject matter of tolerance. One can plausibly conceive that the way 
the sentence is interpreted depends on whether in this case the notion of tolerance is, 
or is not considered entailing a negative evaluation of immigrants. Thus, the crucial 
factor regards the conception of tolerance and whether it is considered to involve the 
first condition of the standard notion of toleration: X has a negative evaluation of Y. 
I argue, that the sentence illustrates the intrinsic power of the concept of 
toleration, as it may, or may not indicate a negative evaluation of immigrants, 
according to whether one s´ conception of the concept of toleration includes a 
negative evaluation of the subject matter. I argue that the subjects of tolerance, in this 
case, immigrants, have a legitimate interest in knowing whether the t´olerance´ they 
are subjected to is, or is not grounded on a negative evaluation.
The third example I will cite, regards the standing of ´ toleration´ as the apparently 
most positive conceivable concept to indicate a common societal disposition which 
signifies acceptance of minorities. Think about the popular, yet vague expression: 
“tolerant society”. The content of the phrase is condensed and functions on implicit 
assumptions concerning primarily: the content of the t´olerance´ at stake, what a 
tolerant society is, and what the subjects of tolerance in such a society are. I assume it is 
ack nowledged, let a lone establ ished . 
14]  Thus, someone who holds the traditional conception of toleration, construes s´ocietal tol-
erance´ in the sentence: “Same-sex marriage laws in Western countries are manifestations of societal 
tolerance”, to indicate a negative evaluation of the possibility of same-sex couples getting married, 
even if the one referring to s´ocietal tolerance´ in the sentence would aim to indicate a neutral or 
positive evaluation of that possibility. 
On the Conceptual Insufficiency of Toleration and the Quest for a Superseding Concept72
safe to suggest that the various minorities living in a tolerant society, are regarded here 
as subjects of toleration. Moreover, I suppose that one important tacit assumption is 
that a “tolerant society” is regarded here as the preferable alternative to an “intolerant 
society”. I argue that the benevolent sounding expression “tolerant society” enjoys 
such a good reputation, since a society that is tolerant, is in the prevalent political 
imagination apparently the morally and politically highest stage OF a society THAT 
people can conceive of.
I argue that the evaluation behind the common disposition towards minorities 
which so far has been called t´oleration /´´ tolerance ,´ has evolved remarkably further 
without this progression having led to an appropriate new concept to express this 
disposition, which is based on a neutral or positive evaluation, instead of a negative 
one. The concept of toleration is, nonetheless, understandably still deployed in 
common discourses, since there is no acknowledged concept available yet, to replace 
t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ in these instances which are i) based on a neutral or positive 
evaluation of the subject matter, and in which ii) the agent has had to resort to 
t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ finds the concept not adequate, since it misrepresents the 
evaluation they want to indicate about the subject matter. 
Ceva proposes to make the move from ´toleration´ to r´espect´ by suggesting 
that, minority issues should generally be framed rather in terms of r´espect´ than 
´toleration .´ (2011, 14) Considering the apparent development of the common 
societal attitude towards various minorities which may have been grounded 
mainly on a negative evaluation, but which has changed and has become gradually 
more based on a neutral or positive evaluation; it appears that utilising the 
concept of ´toleration /´´tolerance´ in describing this societal attitude has become 
outdated and maintaining its usage seems misplaced. Brown, in contrast, explicitly 
discourages replacing ´tolerance´ with some other term or practice. She suggests 
rather a positive political strategy of counter-discourses, alternative political 
speech and, practices. (2006, 205)
In contrast to Brown, I argue that it is crucial to jettison t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ 
where the evaluation of the subject matter is not negative. Since the societal discourses 
in which t´oleration/tolerance´ is utilised are significant in the ethical and political 
dimension, there is an urgency to consider a concept capable of replacing t´oleration .´ 
In the next section, I will examine the conditions of such a replacement. 
SECTION 8 – A N OUTLINE FOR A NEW CONCEPT TO SUPER SEDE 
´TOLER ATION /´´TOLER A NCE´
In this section, I will apply the approach of conceptual engineering to outline 
a concept which is suitable to supersede t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ in the relevant 
contexts. As I noted in section 7, the improved attitudes towards minorities have 
not yet been explicated consequently on a conceptual level. Thus, there is a need 
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to articulate this progression with a concept which distinctly indicates a neutral or 
positive evaluation of minorities. 
I find the concept of ´ respect´ promising as a possible replacement of ´ tolerance .´ 
Ceva notes that respect-based relations are characteristically equal relations between 
the respecter and the one who is respected. She summarises that in a democracy, 
the commitment to respect translates into the imperative of treating all citizens as 
equals. (2011, 7) In addition to being based on equality, respecting tacitly includes 
the idea of being likewise respected. Thus, the notion of respect is essentially carried 
by reciprocity. In contrast, the concept of t´oleration´ is intrinsically characterised by 
an unequal and non-reciprocal relation between the tolerating agent(s) and tolerated 
subject(s), since the very utilisation of t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ triggers an unequal 
power relation. I conclude that a concept based on the idea of respect is therefore 
more appropriate and morally justified to be used to refer to minorities. 
Thus, I am sympathetic of Ceva´ s suggestion that a concept with the ethos 
of r´espect´ should replace t´oleration´ as its´  neutral or positive counterpart. 
Nevertheless, despite their similarity I argue that ´ toleration´ and ´ respect´ also differ 
in their scope as concepts decisively, thus averting a straightforward replacement, 
in which r´espect´ could directly take the place of t´oleration /´´ tolerance .´15 I 
suggest as a possible solution, to outline a concept which is a more fine-grained 
and linguistically f lexible variation of r´espect .´ However, I will begin with giving a 
rationale as to why I consider the concept of r´espect´ incapable of directly occupying 
the conceptual space of t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ and assume the position and role 
t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ has taken in societal discourses. 
First, the concepts of t´oleration´ and r´espect´ are dissimilar in their range 
of expression. ´Toleration´ is far more pointed than r´espect ,´ and its domain of 
application is narrower. The narrower domain of t´oleration ,´ is grounded on its 
conceptually predetermined purpose to indicate accepting, despite a negative 
evaluation of the subject matter. This makes t´oleration´ as a conceptual tool more 
specific than r´espect´ and limits the conceptual scope of t´oleration .´16 In contrast, 
the concept of respect is more general and broad. This circumstance becomes 
illustrated, by that you can meaningfully speak about respect, for instance, towards 
i) nature, ii) elderly people, and iii) religions. The respect disposition involved is very 
different in all three cases. In contrast, I argue that the tolerance disposition, however, 
is always more of the same type, even if its subjects are different.
15] ´Toleration´  and r´espect´  are similar in their content as concepts, as they both indicate 
acceptance. Nevertheless, they also have a categorical difference, in that t´oleration´  is, and r´espect´  is not 
based on a negative evaluation of the respective subject matter.
16] Therefore, r´espect´  cannot directly replace t´olerance´  in the cited definition of tolerance of 
UNESCO, since it would then be phrased: “Respect is acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity 
[...]” I argue that r´espect´  is conceived in too broad terms to express the intention here.
On the Conceptual Insufficiency of Toleration and the Quest for a Superseding Concept74
Another challenge for the replacement of t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ with r´espect´ 
is that the concept of toleration has received the status of a reification of an abstract 
idea of goodwill. This has facilitated the possibility of utilising ´ toleration /´´ tolerance´ 
autonomously without a reference to any particular subject matter. As noted in 
Section 1, t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ has made its way into educational programmes. In 
these programmes, t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ is being used in a reified form in which 
t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ assumes the role of a concept, which has wondrous pacifying 
qualities applicable in all kind of conf licts.17 I doubt that r´espect´ could be conceived 
in a similar manner as a replacement of t´oleration /´´ tolerance .´
Although, I have argued above that a direct replacement of ´ toleration´ /´ tolerance´ 
by r´espect´ is conceptually not plausible, I do think that a linguistic variation 
of r´espect´ which has been modified through conceptual engineering, could 
be suitable to supersede t´oleration´ and t´olerance .´ I outline that the linguistic 
variation should have the i) content and ethos of respect, yet as the word a similar 
ii) form and shape than t´oleration´ and t´olerance´ to be conceived as a potential 
replacement of them.18 
A nother central criterion for a concept suitable to supersede 
´toleration /´´tolerance´ is that it should be characterised by the conceptual 
scope and precision of ´toleration /´´tolerance .´ Furthermore, it should have the 
conceptual expressiveness of toleration/tolerance, to be apt to perform similar 
conceptual tasks than ´toleration /´´tolerance .´ By conceptual expressiveness, I 
mean the capability to indicate distinct evaluations of different subject matters 
e.g. different minority groups.
Given these criteria, I propose as a replacement of t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ 
a conceptually engineered amalgam of toleration/tolerance and respect. My 
suggestion is respectation instead of toleration, and respectance instead of tolerance. 
I find the coinage: r´espectation /´´ respectance´ is in conceptual terms capable 
of superseding t´oleration /´´ tolerance ,´ since it i) resembles the latter word pair 
in its form and shape, so that r´espectation /´´ respectance´ can be conceived as 
replacing t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ when it appears in discourses. I hypothesise, 
moreover, that ii) r´espectation /´´ respectance´ fits into the conceptual space in 
which t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ operates and is therefore suitable to assume iii) the 
conceptual expressiveness of t´oleration /´´ tolerance .´
Obviously, my coinage needs to stand critical testing. First, 
r´espectation /´´ respectance´ should be able to maintain the whole range of 
applicability that t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ has.  In the following, I will apply 
17] I refer here to such projects as the one mentioned in section 1: Teaching Tolerance by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center, and Strategy: Diversity and Tolerance Education in Schools by the National Crime 
Prevention Council. Both projects are based in the US.
18] By having the content and ethos of respect, I mean that the replacing concept is grounded on a 
neutral or positive evaluation.
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r´espectation /´´ respectance´ to sentences cited in this paper. It should, for instance, 
be sufficiently versatile to be utilised independently and in reified forms without a 
reference to any particular subject matter. Thus, the expression: “tolerant society” 
should be able to be rephrased into “respectant society”, and the latter expression 
should, furthermore, be conceived as replacing the former. 
Another examples of rephrasing would be: ´Same-sex marriage laws in 
Western countries are legal manifestations of societal respectance ,´ ´Respectance 
towards immigrants´ , and the cited UNESCO definition would be reformulated: 
´Respectance is acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world›s 
cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human .´
However, a change from ´ toleration /´´ tolerance´ to ´ respectation /´´ respectance´ 
implies certainly more than just a shift of vocabulary. In section 6, I posed the 
hypothesis that since the component of linguistic power is intrinsic to the concept 
of toleration, and the mere expression of t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ in discourses 
thereby triggers an unequal power relation, a replacement of t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ 
by a respect-based term would involve a deliberate relinquishment of power by 
the ones who thus far have been utilising the concept of toleration. I hypothesise, 
moreover, that my proposed substitution would discharge the power relation upheld 
by resorting to t´oleration /´´ tolerance ,´ since the concept of respect and its linguistic 
variation respectation is, unlike the concept of toleration, based on an equal 
relation. Moreover, r´espectation /´´ respectance would release the tense reservation 
maintained by t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ in societal discourses.
Nevertheless, the most momentous implications of a possible replacement in 
the usage of toleration with respectation and tolerance with respectance, are in the moral 
and political dimension. I hypothesise that r´espectation /´´ respectance´ would in a 
conceptually similar way than toleration /´´ tolerance reinforce common attitudes 
towards minorities. Only that these attitudes would be neutral or positive, according 
to the neutral or positive evaluation on which ´ respectation´ / r´espectance´ is grounded. 
Therefore, I consider that the possible substitution of t´oleration /´´ tolerance´ with 
r´espectation /´´ respectance´ has significant emancipatory potential.
nikolai.klix@tuni.fi
On the Conceptual Insufficiency of Toleration and the Quest for a Superseding Concept76
R EFER ENCES
Balint, Peter. 2017. Respecting Toleration: Traditional Liberalism and Contemporary Diversity, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, Wendy. 2006. Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Burgess, Alexis, Herman Cappelen, and Plunkett David. Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual 
Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language – An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ceva, Emanuela. 2011. A Matter of Respect – Conflicts over Mosques and the Treatment 
of Minorities URL = http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/
MWG/201011/05-11-Ceva.pdf (accessed 21.11.2019). 
Di Angelo, Robin. 2012. What Does It Mean to Be White? Developing White Racial Literacy. New 
York: Peter Lang.
Forst, Rainer. 2013. Tolerance in Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 1980. The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction. Translated by 
Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage.
Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta. 2015. “The range of toleration: From toleration as recognition back to 
disrespectful tolerance”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol 41, Issue 2: 93 – 110.
McWilliams, David. 2018. “Why Ireland leads in tolerance towards immigrants.” The Irish 
Times, September 29, 2018. 
National Crime Prevention Council. 2017. “Strategy: Diversity and Tolerance Education in 
Schools” https://www.ncpc.org/resources/bullying/strategies/strategy-diversity-and-
tolerance-education-in-schools/# (accessed 21.11.2019). 
Oxford Latin Dictionary (2nd edition), 2012 Edited by P. G. W. Glare Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Teaching Tolerance. 2019. “About” https://www.tolerance.org/ (accessed 21.11.2019).
UNESCO. 1995. Declaration of Principles on Tolerance: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_
ID=13175&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 21.11.2019).
Zucca, Lorenzo. 2012. A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional Landscape, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
